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Abstract 
This article is a continuous dialogue on memory triggered by Brockmeier’s article 
(2010). I drift away from the conventionalisation of the archive as a spatial metaphor 
for memory in order to consider the greater possibility of ‘time’ for conceptualising 
memory. The concept of time is central to understanding the nature of human 
experience as a process in which a constant flux of change in organism, cultural and 
social practices is observed. Two categories of time have been explored, firstly 
Aristotelian, physical time for an experimental paradigm and secondly, the way in 
which we experience time in terms of autobiographical memory. The second category 
of time is discussed, drawing on Augustine and Bergson amongst others. Bergson’s 
notion of duration has been considered as a promising concept for a better 
understanding of autobiographical memory. Psychological phenomena such as 
autobiographical memory should embrace not only spatial dimension, but also a 
temporal dimension, in which a constant flow of irreversible time, where multiplicity, 
momentarily, dynamic stability and becoming and emergence of novelty can be 
observed.  
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<h1>Metaphor in Memory Research</h1> 
In the book Metaphors we live by (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), it is suggested that 
metaphors not only make our thoughts more vivid and interesting, but they actually 
structure our perceptions and understanding. Metaphors profoundly shape our views 
of life in the present and set up expectations for the future. Metaphors are not just a 
linguistic, but also a conceptual construction. Thus the metaphor archive for memory 
endorses a particular conception of memory, revealing the centrality of human action, 
behaviour and thinking in politics, culture and society studied in memory research 
across the academic disciplines. From the sheer volume of the coverage Brockmeier 
makes in his article (2010), the greater level of abstraction he makes to reach the core 
of the concept, with the more layers of metaphor are required to express the very 
complex abstraction of memory. In defining memory, we categorise and map out the 
layers and function of the thing called memory. It is in this sense that there is a far-
reaching significance in the way Brockmeier reappraised memory studies and 
research. Most of our ordinary conceptual system (including memory) is metaphorical 
in nature (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). This applies to memory researchers. The 
archive metaphor steers a particular approach, paradigm or a range of ways in which 
we think with memory research as human practice. This article is my attempt to drift 
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away from this conventionalisation of the archive as a spatial metaphor for memory 
and to consider the greater possibility of ‘time’ for conceptualising memory. The 
archive metaphor creates certain realities and ontology for researchers. Researcher’s 
construction of memory as a research object needs to be interrogated. Metaphor is an 
imaginative rationality, bringing together the reason and the imagination (Lakoff and 
Johnson); so far the archive metaphor only tells half of the story of memory.  
 
Brockmeier (2010) assiduously paved the way forward in contemporary 
developments in memory research and mapped it brilliantly into four fields - the 
social and cultural, media and technology, the literary and artistic, the biological and 
neuroscience. It is a history of memory studies in the making. He makes a laudable 
contribution in two ways. Firstly, as a comprehensive survey, he helps us see past 
achievements by clearing the bushes in our paths of memory research and locating 
those milestones in the interwoven paths.  Secondly, the survey helps us identify the 
next path forward, with which we come to see new directions in how the current 
achievement should be taken further. Brockmeier’s central aim is to show “that what 
we call memory is, like Ondaatje’s kaleidoscope, one of those tricky phenomena 
whose assumed material reality and our views about it cannot really be separated” 
(Brockmeier 2010, p. 7).  He questions the popular idea of memory as storage, “the 
archive” of the past, although the archive metaphor has been influential in addressing 
what memory is and how it works from antiquity to the contemporary era. The storage 
metaphor of memory is still very dominant in contemporary academic disciplines 
such as experimental psychology and neuroscience, but as Brockmeier says, this story 
starts to collapse in the face of “the memory crisis” (p. 9). We have seen 
groundbreaking efforts and radical moves being made, departing from and 
challenging those traditions that monopolised memory research, including 
philosophy, psychology and neuroscience. The crisis created a new order and brought 
in fresh, new air to memory research in the 21
st
 Century. But to whom is the crisis? 
Upon “the memory crisis” the field was laid open to those other researchers beyond 
the laboratory, to the world of living, becoming and transformation in human 
experience. Following Pierre Nora’s lieux de memoire, sites of memory, modern 
memory as archival storage relies on the mentality of the trace, the immediacy of the 
recording and the visibility of the image (Nora 1989).  
 
<h2>The Archive Re-imagined </h2> 
In recent years, despite this face-value use of the archive metaphor, there has been a 
renewed recognition of the archive as more than a physical entity. Derrida, for 
instance, interrogates the notion of archive, drawing on the etymology in Greek times 
and has traced the genealogy of archive to show how the archive was used in different 
times and cultures. Following Derrida, Carolyn Steedman (2001) recapitulates 
Derrida’s main argument and recast the meaning of the archive into a varied, perhaps 
more nuanced, role that was played out before the storage. Archive is more than a 
repository or record office. Archive is a derivative of the Greek word ‘arkhe’ as ‘a 
place things begin’ where power originates, its workings being inextricably bound up 
with the authority of beginnings and starting points’ (Steedman, 2001, p. 1). ‘For the 
archive: the fever not so much to enter it and use it, as to have it, or just for it to be 
there, in the first place’ (Steedman, 2001, p. 2). ‘Archive Fever’, the desire for the 
archive, is presented as part of the desire to find, or locate, or possess that moment of 
origin, as the beginning of things. Archive in this view functions as a place of 
authority marking in time its beginning and origin. Archive metaphor as it is re-
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imagined by Derrida and Steedman, is relevant to autobiographical memory with an 
implied sense of the marking of a person’s origin and beginning.  
 
This link between the archive metaphor and autobiographical memory leads me to 
think why in the world do we think of people’s lives as having a clear marking of 
their origins and beginning – the temporality of lives seems to be incorporated as a 
default feature of autobiographical memory. Certainly the autobiographical memory – 
the story of one’s life, as a corporeal, finite living organism having a span of time 
which marks its beginning (birth) and its end (death) - works if we were only 
concerned about the content of what goes in the memory. However, this does not 
necessarily seem to be synonymous with understanding the temporal nature of human 
experience and its recollection and memory. 
 
<h1>Reading Brockmeier</h1> 
Writing about memory is fascinating and appeals to the heart and mind of an 
interdisciplinary audience, but the task is utterly daunting due to both its vastness and 
the ubiquity of the field. Clearly, we can agree that memory is impossible to define as 
a single object (Brockmeier 2010).  It is “by nature multiple and yet specific; 
collective, plural, and yet individual” according to Nora (1989), capturing its 
complexity and indefinability by drawing on Maurice Halbwachs. Much of the 
contemporary memory studies are compartmentalised in binary oppositions--
individual vs group, private vs public, personal vs. social-collective, singular vs 
multiple, specific vs general. What is more, technological advancement, especially 
digital innovation within contemporary life, provides modalities and media, with 
which we are able to capture and replay one’s experience of the here-and-now and 
share it with others at a global distance. Here, again and again, I come across a puzzle 
of time. It is time to take time seriously.  
 
<h2>Place/site of Memory</h2> 
What is this very taken for granted idea of the past, present and future? Indeed, when 
we refer to the present in commonsense language as being the here and now, this 
implies that the present entails time and place. I want to start with a place/spatial 
metaphor. In characterising memory research, that is complex and unfathomable, 
Nora labels memory as the lieux (places/sites) which are “mixed, hybrid, mutant, 
bound intimately with life and death, with time and eternity; enveloped in a Möbius 
strip of the collective and the individual, the sacred and the profane, the immutable 
and the mobile” (Nora 1989, p. 19).  The strip holds a unity of opposites. He goes on 
to say: 
 
“For if we accept that the most fundamental purpose of the lieu de memoire is to 
stop time, to block the work of forgetting, to establish a sate of things, to 
immortalize death, to materialize the immaterial…all of this in order to capture 
a maximum of meaning in the fewest of signs, it is also, it is also clear that lieux 
de memoire only exist because of their capacity for metamorphosis, an endless 
of recycling of their meaning and an unpredictable proliferation of their 
ramification.” (Nora, 1989, p. 19) 
 
As in the paradox of the archive in critical terms of Derrida (or Steedman), the 
material nature of memory in the sense of ‘lieu de memoire’ does not seem to stabilise 
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the past and to contain it. In order to gain a sense of a place, memory has to endure 
time. Perhaps the Möbius strip exemplifies the time dimension of memory. 
 
Undoubtedly we can appreciate Brockmeier’s competence in mapping the field as far 
as autobiographical memory is concerned. Yet Brockmeier pays least attention to the 
issue of time. Likewise, Nora, in making a distinction between memory and history, 
coins a term, the lieux (places) de memoire. Whether it is an archive or lieux de 
memorie, it emphasises the materiality of memory in a spatial sense. Both metaphors 
seem to defer a consideration of the concept of time or temporality. What comes 
“after archive’ is rethinking time for memory. The concept of time is central to 
understanding the nature of human experience as a process in which a constant flux of 
change in organism, cultural and social practices is observed.  
 
<h1>Rethinking time in autobiographical memory</h1> 
Studies of autobiographical memory are abreast with those of human development. 
The concept of time cannot be overlooked when it comes to development over the 
individual life span. Commonsensically, we tend to look at development by physical 
time or clock time. For instance, birthdays mark developmental milestones. Academic 
achievement is assessed at the end of an academic year. As in spatialised notion of 
‘lieux de memoire’, we treat time as a measurement unit. We objectify and stabilise 
time in such a way in order to manipulate it as a factor in a causal model. Clock time 
underpins the experimental, causal paradigm as an important conceptual tool for the 
researcher’s understanding of the research subject. As Valsiner suggests, “[m]ost of 
psychology is build on the non-developmental premises, utilizing representations of 
the ‘object-like’… static explanations” (Valsiner 2000, p. 8). This approach fails to 
understand the state of development as dynamic stability. A phenomenon may “exist 
in a stable state, yet its stability is a result of constant dynamic processes that maintain 
that stability” (p. 8). Stability might be temporary – it may disappear and re-appear in 
a new form. As in most biographical, psychological and social systems, 
autobiographical memory can be considered to be in the permanent/constant process 
of change. To me, autobiographical memory shares this very characterisation of 
dynamic stability, in which change unfolds during an irreversible time. Valsiner 
elaborates that: 
 
“[t]urning the irreversible time process into reversible units of time, these static 
description of time can be seen as examples of ‘reversible time’. Continuous 
events can be turned discrete with specifiable ‘end points’ to experiences. By 
trying to measure time, the duration notion is lost and time becomes represented 
in ways similar to space…Time is irreversible as it flows, intricately linked with 
our experiencing our relations with our worlds.” (Valsiner, 2000, p. 8) 
 
Throughout intellectual history, but ostensibly in philosophy and physics, great 
thinkers have engaged in the concepts of time. According to Schatzki (Schatzki 2006), 
two categories of time dominated 20th century philosophy. The first includes such 
concepts as physical time, the time of objects in space, and the time of the world, or as 
Ramo’s explanation, which refers to chronos (or kronos) in the Greek mythological 
conceptions of time. The second comprises human time, or lived time, or, better put, 
the time of experience or consciousness. Its Greek counterpart is kairos, meaning 
opportune time, the kind of time that does not sit on the linear temporality as in 
chronos. Murray addresses that time is a personal concept, it is through chronos that 
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we can share publicly the sense of time (Priestley 1964; Murray 2000 ). Referring to 
the two conceptions of time from his practice of working with people suffering from 
mental illness in the field of psychiatry, he characterises kairos as personally 
experienced time referring to “that rewarding involvement in life during which we 
lose the sense of time passing… Kairos is soul satisfying and soul nourishing” 
(Murray, 2000, p. 61). 
 
According to O’hashi (Ohashi 2004) and Schatzki (2006), the first category of clock 
time is construed as a causal time paradigm, being traced back to Aristotle's (1941: 
219b1 cited in Schatzki 2006, p. 155) definition of time as "number of motion in 
respect to before and after” (Rämö 2002). For Aristotle, time cannot be conceived 
without motion and perceiving change. This echoes Valsiner’s critique on the current 
approach to study development non-developmentally in terms of measureable units of 
time. Time is objectified and represented in a linear model. This underpins 
autobiographical memory as archive, or storage, where past events are simply 
reproduced within the physical, clock time (O’hashi, 2004, pp. 21-23).  
 
Meanwhile, the second category can be traced to the work of the distinguished 
philosopher-theologian St. Augustine (Augustine 1992 (400)). In Book 11 of St. 
Augustine's Confessions, he ruminates on the nature of time, asking, "What then is 
time? Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do 
not know." (Augustine, p. 230). Augustine’s time is a stark contrast to the Aristotelian 
causal time as a linear time line of succession of ‘instants’: 
"It is now, however, perfectly clear that either the future nor the past are in 
existence... There are three times ---a present of things past, a present of things 
present, and a present of things future.” (cited in Schatzki 2006, p. 155).  
 
Elusiveness of memory for Brockmeier may lie in the very puzzle of time: Augustine 
says “[n]either time past nor future, the present only, reality is” (XI: 11). “If no one 
asks me, I know what time is; if I want to explain it to him, I don’t know what time it 
is” (Augustine). Augustine’s soliloquy continues: 
 
“For what is time? Who can easily and briefly explain it? Who even in though 
can comprehend it, even to the pronouncing of a word concerning it? But what 
in speaking do we refer to more familiarity and knowingly than time? And 
certainly we understand when we speak of it; we understand also when we hear 
it spoken of by another. What, then, is time?” (Augustine, XI:11) 
 
For Augustine, it is not the past that is memory, but “the present about the past”. 
O’hashi calls Augustinian past the act of remembering (O'hashi, 2000).  This view of 
time seems to reflect the work of Fredrick Bartlett, in his famous studies of serial and 
repeated reproduction and the concept of schema (O'hashi, 2000). O'hashi argues that 
what we call memory should be considered as the act of remembering, that is a 
relational, situated generative social activity (and interaction) each time the event is 
remembered. This is different from memory conceived from the concept of 
Aristotelian time for memory, which is concerned with the accurate reproduction of 
the original event.  
 
In focusing on the act of autobiographical remembering as a social and discursive 
action of telling, autobiographical memory is a time-related phenomenon. Whilst 
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clock time is operating, we need to focus on the psychological time, that Augustine 
refers to. Such consideration would give us further insight into the act of 
remembering/recollection, the way in which a storyteller makes meanings of the 
character’s (including the person that ‘tells’) action and decisions. What may be 
useful for us from this thinking about time is to advance beyond a spatial 
understanding of time – by using metaphors such as archive, lieux de memoire, we 
have come to overlook that the experience is a phenomenon of duration.   
 
Henri Bergson radically questioned the physical time at the turn of 20
th
 Century. It is 
not surprising that Bergson’s thinking about time was under-appreciated at the time 
given the fact that experimental psychology acquired its prominent status only in 
modern psychology (although Bergson’s influence to William James, and vice versa, 
was well documented). In the late 20
th
 Century, the work of Bergson has become 
revitalised with the help of Deleuze, who made Bergson in vogue again. Recently, 
critical psychologists (e.g., Middleton and Brown) followed suit, engaging his 
thoughts and conducting their critical re-analysis of the empirical work on memory 
and remembering. They too have helped us see the relevance of Bergson. It is on this 
basis that I now turn to Bergson’s notion of duration (la durée), in extending kronos 
and Augustine’s concept of time. 
 
<h2>Duration: Time as undivided whole</h2> 
To me, Bergson helps us see the scale of time differently, building on Augustine’s 
notion of the past and the future in relation to the present. In examining the time of 
ongoing human activity such as memory, and acts of remembering and forgetting, 
linear time, independent from the world, presents us with a serious limitation. This 
refers to the central premise that everything is momentary. 
 
Bergson disputed that separating out and describing these various on-going events is 
an accomplishment of memory: whereas memory records and virtually contains those 
on-going events (e.g., 1988, p. 151), thought leaps into memory and articulates these 
particular memories as recollections. On the contrary, Bergson claimed, in “real 
time… actions and perceptions form an undivided whole” (Bergson 1988, p. 138). 
Bergson defined duration as “the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into 
the future and wells as it advances” (1988, p. 150); it involves the past in its entirety, 
[being] prolonged into [the] present, and abid[ing] there, actual and active (1911, p. 
15).  
 
<h2>Duration: Elasticity of memory</h2> 
Elsewhere, I have analysed narratives of redemption and reconciliation (Murakami 
2007), drawing on positioning theory (Davies and Harré 1990; Harré and van 
Langenhove 1998). In hindsight, this analysis relies on ‘positioning’, which I 
recognise as a ‘spatial’ metaphor.  Those storied events, being ‘positioned’ side by 
side in the telling are presented as an evidence of change. I argued that the contrasting 
ways in which the British veteran, Freddie, perceived, felt and acted toward Japanese 
people exemplified the veteran’s discursive accomplishment of redemption and 
reconciliation.  Clearly I overlooked the time dimension in my analysis. There is the 
time in between events. We can only speculate fuzziness, vagueness and messiness in 
the ways in which Freddie perceived, felt and made sense of his everyday life during 
the post-war years. There is a lot that is unaccounted for within Freddie’s life in 
between those told events. Beyond this analysis, which made me understand the 
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nature of reconciliation as discursive accomplishment, it might be possible to apply 
Bergson’s concept of duration to this discourse phenomenon. If we were to consider 
durational time as an elastic band, we can see the life of Freddie as elastic band, 
which stretches and un-stretches. Perhaps, it is because of the elasticity of time as 
duration that the narrative of redemption is made visible (to me, at least). Rather than 
thinking of the narrative as a strip of film or tape, which might be edited out and 
spliced, the act of remembering – the present telling of past events can be seen as an 
elastic band for the duration. Such experience of duration is elastic, whereas the flow 
of time is irreversible and indivisible.  
 
According to Bergson, in the duration, there is no juxtaposition of events; therefore 
there is no mechanistic causality. The time between those storied events is the 
duration of which we can speak of “the experience of freedom” and might be 
construed as the zone of indeterminacy (Lawlor and Moulard 2008). Discourse 
analytic approach, although purporting to make visible variability and qualitative 
multiplicity in people’s experiences, can enhance their viability of the approach by 
taking into consideration the second category of time as Bergson and his allies 
suggest. We can enquire further what we mean by qualitative multiplicity from a 
Bergsonian time perspective, that is “[i]n the duration, there is no juxtaposition of 
events; therefore there is no mechanistic causality. It is in the duration that we can 
speak of the experience of freedom” (Lawlor and Mouland, 2011, p. 5).  This is very 
much in line with the indeterminacy of the past and the future as a developmental 
concept. 
 
I hope to have illustrated that the above evaluation of the analysis, aided by 
positioning theory, highlights that the past is endured in the present by taking time as 
being of an elastic duration. Aligned with O’hashi, Middleton and Brown argue 
beyond the spatialised conception of experience. Again, this has an implication to the 
way we understand people’s experience of time as not just a matter of passing 
moments (Middleton and Brown 2005). As Bergson argues, time is not simply a 
series of ‘instants’.  
 
“Our continuity as beings comes from the undivided way in which we endure 
through time… Our thoughts and feelings do not fade as fleeting moments 
because time does not…break into tiny segments. Our duration is a continuous 
‘gnawing of the past into the present,’ where the present is infused with the 
burden of a past that does not pass, does not escape us” (Middeoton and Brown 
2005, p, 224)  
 
Bergson’s view of duration as ‘unlimited experience’ according to Middleton and 
Brown resonates Ohashi’s view of time based on his work on testimony and 
confessions. Perhaps, we can better understand not just memory, but all psychological 
phenomenon by taking ‘duration’ into an account. 
 
<h2>River and Broom</h2> 
So, in what ways is autobiographical memory qualitatively multiple? And constant in 
flux and momentary? We can see the archive metaphor falls short. Researchers (Sato, 
Hidaka et al. 2009; Sato and Valsiner 2010) pondered on this very question by 
metaphors of river and broom in theorising the trajectory of life in development. A 
broom of time is solid and flows like streams of a river, being bundled by some 
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practical, local situational order and communicative demands. Yet at the same time, 
we want to grasp the river-ness, a whole, of the autobiographical memory phenomena.  
 
As for indeterminacy and multiplicity and variability of memory as well as the 
inseparable/indivisible sense of time, Bergson is in line with William James’s view of 
reality and the constructed nature of recollection: 
 
“I believe he would “have established the same relation as between the life we 
live every day and the life which actors portray in the evening on the stage. On 
the stage, each actor says and does only what has to be said and done; the scenes 
are clear-cult; the play has a beginning, a middle and an end; and everything is 
worked as economically as possible with a view to an ending which will be 
happy or tragic. But in life, a multitude of useless things are said, many 
superfluous gestures made, there a no sharply drawn situations; nothing happens 
as simply or as completely or as nicely as we should like; the scenes overlap; 
things neither begin nor end; there is no perfectly satisfying ending, nor 
absolutely decisive gesture, none of these telling words which give us pause: all 
the effects are spoiled. Such is human life. And such, no doubt, in James’s eyes, 
is reality in general.” (Bergson, 1946/1992, p. 210) 
 
Relevance of the river metaphor for Bergson, aligned with James, is unmissable: 
“To be sure, our experience is not in coherent…it shows us relationships 
between the things and connections between the facts: these relations are as real, 
as directly observable, according to William James, as the things and facts 
themselves. But the relations are fluctuating and things fluid. This is vastly 
different from that dry universe constructed by the philosophers with elements 
that are clear-cut and well-arranged, where each part is not only linked to 
another part, as experience shows us, but also, as our reason would have it, is 
coordinated to the whole. (1946/1992 pp. 210-211) 
 
Bergson reflects on the “pluralism” of William James that: 
 
“reality no longer appears as finite or as infinite, but simply as indefinite. It 
flows without our being able to say whether it is in a single direction, or even 
whether it is always and throughout the same river flowing.” (Bergson, p. 211) 
 
Along with other philosophers such as Heraclitus, who says “You cannot step out into 
the same river twice,” Bergson catches our new imagination of time/duration as a 
river that constantly flows,  Möbius strip or kaleidoscope whilst maintaining its 
wholeness. Memory has a characteristic of a unity of holding opposites and a constant 
flux of change. 
 
<h1>Conclusion and Implications</h1> 
In this article, I have reflected on Brockmeier (2010) and explored autobiographical 
memory from the point of view of time and duration. I started with an observation of 
time as a less considered, taken for granted concept in memory studies, whereas 
popular spatial references and metaphors of characterised and defined memory are 
profusely dominant. I then outlined two, classically different categories of time – 
Aristotelian and causal time. I am in full agreement with Brockmeier and other 
featured scholars in the Brockmeier forum (Echterhoff 2011; Mori 2011; Wertsch 
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2011) that we are in the post-archive era in terms of memory research. The archival 
model of memory assumes the physical, clock time, for examining human memory, 
seeking to stabilise and objectify human experience (such as remembering and 
forgetting) as an encoding, storage, organisation, and retrieval of life events in the 
measurable unit and span of time. I then ventured into the other category, Augustine’s 
time, the Bergsonian time called ‘duration (la durée)’ and addressed its possibilities 
for memory studies in social sciences. Surely, there are a number of implications in 
reconsidering autobiographical memory in terms of Bergson’s duration. This sheds 
light into the way in which autobiographical memory and its telling can be studied as 
creative/generative acts in life, in an open ecological system, where humans and 
nature, mind and matter are inseparable dynamic relations to a constitute wholeness.  
 
Although this conclusion might have been well rehearsed in much of CAP and other 
critical psychology journals over the last decade or so, it is a worthwhile reminder that 
indeterminacy, complexity, multiplicity and ambiguity are important features of 
human psychological (memory) phenomena of time and experience. Psychology, with 
recent development in social and cultural psychology, can leave room for other ways 
of thinking about memory by considering time/duration as an underpinning concept in 
the process that captures the ephemeral as well as the enduring features of the 
meaning making in a given environment and culture in embodied social interactions.  
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